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The objective of this chapter is double. First, we take stock of the ways in which 
the institutionalist literature deals with issues of institutional change and institu-
tional emergence. Then, we try to show how the connection we make between 
globalization and institutions opens up new theoretical directions.  
Under the label ‘institutionalism’ or ‘institutional theory’, one finds a rather 
heterogeneous body of literature originating from different disciplines and based 
on rather distinct ontological assumptions about human behaviour. Building upon 
Hall and Taylor (1996) and Djelic (2001) we identify three main and distinct 
perspectives on institutions that we label respectively ‘rational choice’, ‘cultural’ 
and ‘historical’. 
Towards a Typology of Institutional Arguments 
The ‘rational choice’ perspective is found predominantly amongst economists 
and political scientists – particularly for the latter group in the international rela-
tions literature. This perspective tends to focus on formal and structural political 
and economic institutions. The existence of institutions is accounted for in an 
essentially functionalist way – institutions are there because they solve prob-
lems for actors. Institutional order is seen as arising from negotiations 
between rational actors pursuing preferences or interests that will in a particular 
case be better served through coordinated and institutionalized action (Crouch 
and Streeck 1997). Self-interested actors make decisions and create institutions 
which they believe most efficient in a particular situation (North 1981; William-
son 1985). From this perspective, both the origins of those frames and action 
within them reflect a ‘logic of expected consequences’ (March and Olsen 1998).  
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‘Cultural’ and ‘historical’ perspectives have roots in classical and more par-
ticularly Weberian sociology (Weber 1978). In the cultural perspective, insti-
tutions are ‘wider cultural and symbolic patterns’, increasingly with a ‘global’ or 
transnational scope, that shape and to a large extent determine organizations, 
structures or actors and script behaviours and interactions (Scott, Meyer et al. 
1994; Jepperson 2000a). Institutions, from this perspective, are not produced – 
they are external ‘realities’, they are givens and determining constraints to which 
actors, structures, organizations or even nation-states conform give or take a 
degree of decoupling (Meyer et al. 1997). In the long run, those institutions are 
on an evolutionary path leading towards greater rationalization and this the world 
over, naturally with standardization and homogenizing effects (Scott, Meyer et 
al. 1994, pp. 2-4). The origins of this evolutionary path are to be found in cul-
tural schemas provided by Christendom and in the structuration of the modern 
system of nation-states (Jepperson 2000b). From this type of perspective, action 
reflects normative patterns. The logic of ‘action’ can be described using March 
and Olsen’s terms (1998) as a ‘logic of appropriateness’ – knowing, however, 
that ‘action’ here cannot be understood as ‘free agency’. 
From an historical perspective, institutions are frameworks essentially of a 
political, legal and societal nature. These frameworks are made up of organiza-
tions and formal rules and regulations often backed by coercive mechanisms and 
structures. This perspective insists on the particular significance of nation-states 
historically for the emergence and structuration of those frameworks. Those 
national institutional frameworks create powerful constraints at the national 
level and they lay out path dependencies that explain variations across countries 
in patterns of action, organization and interaction (Fligstein 1990; Whitley 1992, 
1999; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; Hall and Soskice 2001). Those path 
dependencies also explain the robustness of national institutional frameworks – 
each of which is articulated in fact as a system (Whitley 1999; Maurice and 
Sorge 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). From that perspective, the origins of insti-
tutional frames are external to actors for whom they essentially represent con-
straints and coercive mechanisms. And indeed action follows in that perspective 
what we call a ‘logic of coercive constraint’.  
Table 1 brings together in summary form and contrasts those three per-
spectives on institutions. For the purposes of this volume, we are moving 
towards our own type of institutional argument (see also Djelic 1998) that com-
bines elements of all three perspectives and more particularly of the ‘cultural’ 
and ‘historical’ ones in an attempt at cross-fertilization (Djelic 2001). 
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Table 1: Towards a Typology of Institutional Arguments 
 ‘Rational choice’ 
institutionalism 
‘Cultural’  
institutionalism 
‘Historical’  
institutionalism 
Definition of  
institutions 
Formal and structural 
economic and 
political frames 
Wider cultural and  
symbolic patterns 
Formal and structural 
political, legal, 
societal frames 
backed up by 
coercive mechanisms 
Origins Rational interest of  
actors, calculus 
Long-term evolution 
– external reality 
Nationally-shaped 
path dependencies – 
external reality 
Logic of action Rational interest of  
actors, calculus 
Appropriateness Constraint 
Definition of Institutions 
In this volume, we use an umbrella definition of institutions as consisting of 
both structures and formal systems on the one hand and normative and cognitive 
frames on the other that altogether provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour (Scott 1995; see also Djelic and Quack in the conclusion to this 
volume). These sets of institutions owe their survival to self-activating social 
processes of reproduction (Jepperson 1991). In our view, institutions have both a 
structural dimension, including formal and informal rules and systems and an 
ideational dimension, including normative and cognitive patterns. Whereas these 
two dimensions have always been treated and approached separately and by dif-
ferent streams of the institutional argument, we believe that in order to under-
stand processes of institutional change and emergence both dimensions should 
be brought together and investigated simultaneously (see also Campbell 1998; 
Djelic 1998).  
We also combine the ‘culture’ and ‘historical’ perspectives in a different 
manner. We acknowledge the need to take into consideration together and at 
the same time the two levels of analysis that characterize each of these perspec-
tives – ‘global’ or transnational for the cultural perspective and national for the 
historical one. As we will see below, one way to reconcile institutional argu-
ments with issues of change and emergence is precisely to look at the interplay 
and interface between these two spheres or levels of analysis.  
Another way in which to bring in issues of change and emergence is to take 
some distance from descriptions of institutions as constraining or even deter-
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mining behaviours – which is predominantly what institutional analyses do 
both in the cultural and in the historical stream. We need to think also of the 
enabling functions of institutions. It is necessary to investigate, in other words 
the ways in which actors creatively recombine and extend the institutional prin-
ciples at their disposal to devise new institutional solutions to their problems 
(Sewell 1992; Campbell 1997; Clemens and Cook 1999; Caspar 2000; Kris-
tensen 2000; Lane 2001; Sharpe 2001). It is necessary in other words to think of 
the conditions for ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ (Fligstein and Mara-Drita 
1996). Actors, here, are not the ‘free agents’ of the rational choice perspective 
but neither are they merely an aggregation of cultural scripts as suggested in the 
cultural perspective. We will show below that such recombination is much more 
likely in situations where different institutional frames enter into collision. One 
place, undeniably, where such collision is significant today is at the interface 
between national and transnational spheres.  
In the following, we look more systematically into the treatment of change 
and emergence in the institutionalist literature. This naturally comes together 
with the correlative issues of institutional persistence and its conditions. We 
point, in the process, to the main building blocks of our own theoretical 
framework underscoring the ways in which it differs from existing perspectives.  
Institutional Change and Persistence 
A core insight behind institutional theory is that the patterning of social life is 
not produced solely by the aggregation of individual and organizational behav-
iours but also by institutions that structure actions through regulative instru-
ments as well as normative and cognitive frames. Institutions and social actions 
are thus seen as being inextricably linked and as reciprocally and mutually con-
stituting each other. Institutional accounts, particularly those fitting under the 
label ‘historical’ used above, have tended to emphasize the stability and durabil-
ity of institutions. These accounts are based on an understanding of institutional 
arrangements where the latter are internally coherent and externally fitted. They 
tend to focus, furthermore, on the constraining or even determining effects of 
institutions on social behaviour rather than on potential converse and reciprocal 
effects.  
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Conditions of Institutional Persistence 
There are two main ways in which institutions can constrain social behaviour – 
either through external control and sanctioning or through persuasion, voluntary 
appropriation or socialization. Those institutional arguments that centre on states 
– their structures and constituent organizations – hence ‘historical’ institutional-
ism in our typology, tend to underscore the importance of control and sanction-
ing processes. In those arguments, the nation-state or state agencies have the 
capacity to establish rules, monitor conformity and exert sanctions if necessary. 
The power to sanction and control, however, does not have to be restricted to the 
nation-state and its agencies. Other societal bodies such as private firms and 
agencies or non-governmental organizations can exert authority based on their 
control over or access to resources and this may even extend beyond the borders 
of a particular nation-state with the potential risk of conflicting with or even 
undermining state authority (Strange 1996).  
A second way in which institutions constrain behaviour is through processes 
of persuasion that operate in the absence of formal and centralized sanctioning 
authorities. These processes reflect essentially normative and cognitive logics 
and we identified ‘culture’ institutionalists as focusing more particularly on 
these types of logics. Norms and values become appropriated and internalized 
by individuals, groups or organizations, which motivates them to respect and 
defend the status quo even in the absence of controls or sanctions. Educational 
and professional organizations are good examples of societal bodies relying on 
these types of logics to ensure homogeneity and stabilization of behaviours.  
Naturally, in situations where diffused rule setting is effected apparently 
through persuasion, it is much more difficult to identify and/or recognize power 
and power relations. It seems reasonable, nevertheless, to differentiate between 
those situations where a number of actors have privileged access to some 
resources that allow them to promote and push their own normative and cogni-
tive frames and those situations where actors have more equal access to 
resources and get to develop collectively shared understandings and frames out 
of mutual interaction and dialogue.  
The constraining power and dimension of institutions can explain their per-
sistence and robustness over time. The motives of social actors to support exist-
ing institutions and oppose change can reflect the articulation of two comple-
mentary rational logics – the fear of sanctions for subordinates and the desire to 
defend vested interests for dominant groups. These motives can also reveal suc-
cessful socialization and internalization that led actors to believe that existing 
institutions are the best, the only or the most efficient solutions.  
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We propose that the stability, robustness and self-reproducing character of 
institutions will be all the more pronounced that regulative pressures and sys-
tems of control combine with normative and cognitive frames and reinforce each 
other. Legal institutions, for example, would hardly be as effective if they were 
not strengthened by actors’ internalized beliefs of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, of 
what is ‘honesty’ and ‘fraud’, and so on. The view that institutions articulate 
into systems – particularly at the national level – naturally makes stability and 
robustness even more likely. The homogeneity and coherence of the whole is 
assumed to have an impact on the preservation and reproduction of the parts 
(Burns and Flam 1987; Jepperson 1991; Whitley 1999; Maurice and Sorge 
2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). 
The Nature of Institutional Change 
The extreme picture of a self-stabilizing, self-reproducing and tightly fitted sys-
tem of constraints, characteristic in particular of historical institutionalism, 
leaves little place in this form to the idea of institutional system change or to 
the consideration of institutional emergence.  
With respect to change of institutional systems, particularly those institu-
tional systems of a national scope, institutional perspectives have tended to do 
one of three things. A number of these perspectives have de-emphasized change, 
pointing at the most to small, progressive or non-consequential steps. This has 
particularly been the case for the historical stream of institutional arguments. 
Instead of change, these perspectives have underscored the enduring stability 
and resilience of national institutional frameworks or systems even in the face of 
significant pressure for change, as stemming for example from processes of 
internationalization (D’Iribarne 1989, Whitley 1999; Maurice and Sorge 2000; 
Zeitlin and Herrigel 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001). Some of the resilience of 
national institutional systems has been related to what can be called their inher-
ent ‘flexibility for stability’. These are mechanisms and properties which enable 
societal systems to adapt and readjust to changes in their environment without 
breaking with the overall system logic (Burns and Flam 1987; Offe 1995; Pem-
pel 1998; Quack and Morgen 2000). 
Alternatively, some institutional arguments have acknowledged the possibil-
ity of a transformation of national institutional frameworks but essentially as a 
dramatic and rupture-like process, often implying a major crisis (Westney 1987; 
Djelic 1998). This suggests a picture of punctuated equilibria – a Kuhnian-type 
succession between periods of stability and moments of paradigm shift (Kuhn 
1996; Krasner 1984). 
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A third approach has pointed to a long-term evolutionary process whereby a 
world-society carrying standardized and rationalized cultural and normative 
patterns was building up. In time, national institutional systems were coming to 
reflect those patterns becoming in the process increasingly homogeneous 
(Meyer et al. 1997; Jepperson 2000a). This has defined the cultural stream of 
institutional arguments. Beyond the evolutionary trajectory, there is little speci-
fication in that approach of the concrete ways in which this world-society insti-
tutional frame is building up and being structured, or of the concrete mecha-
nisms through which it is reverberating and translating into institutional system 
change at the national level. 
From our perspective, a dichotomous opposition in the form of extreme 
alternative between radical and incremental change is not satisfying. Rupture-
like change processes are assumed to have the potential to effect a radical trans-
formation of the core institutional order of a society such ‘that we can speak of a 
change in type of society’ (Lockwood 1964, p. 244). Incremental institutional 
change, in contrast, is expected to be path dependent and rarely consequential by 
definition. Indeed, preexisting institutions constrain the ways in which actors 
perceive and choose alternative solutions when earlier arrangements become 
challenged and, as a consequence, the core institutional order of society remains 
in place, unchanged or, at the most, only slightly modified (North 1990; Camp-
bell et al. 1991; Whitley and Kristensen 1997; Whitley 1999; Maurice and 
Sorge 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001).  
In fact, even in situations of rupture-like change, quite a number of institu-
tional principles will carry over from one period to the next. Campbell (1997, 
p. 28), for example, concludes from his collaborative work on institutional trans-
formation in Central and Eastern Europe that dichotomies ‘such as these convey 
the impression that fundamental institutional change is a discontinuous 
process when even ostensibly revolutionary changes often embody significant 
evolutionary qualities’. 
On the other hand, incremental models of change may be largely overesti-
mating the continuity of institutional arrangements over the long run. In this 
book we suggest that, in certain circumstances, incremental change may be 
highly consequential – we call that the ‘stalactite’ model of change (for more see 
Djelic and Quack in the conclusion to this volume). This type of change may 
lead in time and progressively to a profound and qualitative transformation of 
the core institutional order or at least of some of its key dimensions. Our ‘sta-
lactite’ model of change is one where change is seen as both incremental and 
consequential – where change is in fact the aggregation and crystallization 
through time of a multiplicity of smaller processes of transformation. We posi-
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tion this ‘stalactite’ model of change as complementing rather than displacing 
other perspectives.  
Loci and Triggers of Institutional Change 
According to Tolbert and Zucker (1996) the emergence of institutions is a pro-
cess in three stages. First, actors develop through recurrent and regular inter-
actions patterned reactions to problems to which shared meanings and under-
standings become attached (see also Berger and Luckmann 1967). This is in 
fact a pre-institutionalization stage.  
Then these particular meanings and understandings become generalized 
beyond the specific context in which they crystallized. This second stage can 
be called the objectification stage and goes together with the stabilization of a 
consensus among social actors about the value of the behavioural patterns and 
of their associated meanings and understandings. This consensus can translate 
into preliminary structures and rules that on the whole remain fragile at this 
semi-institutionalized stage and can still be revised or challenged.  
The third and last stage of institutionalization is what Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996) call ‘sedimentation’. It is characterized both by an even wider spread of 
patterned behaviours and meanings and by the solidification and perpetuation 
of structures. It is during this last stage that institutions can potentially acquire 
the ‘quality of exteriority’, that is, become taken for granted and develop a 
reality of their own. 
The logical sequencing goes from habitualization to sedimentation. However, 
it is possible in a number of situations to skip the first stage – the habitualiza-
tion stage. The diffusion of institutional rules preexisting in a different context 
represents such a short cut with a direct move into the objectification stage 
(Tolbert and Zucker 1996). Following DiMaggio and Powell (1983), there are 
three main channels for such a process of diffusion – the coercive, the mimetic 
and the normative. All three types of channels may be operative simultane-
ously thus reinforcing each other. They may also alternate or follow each other – 
the coercive channel being supported over time or even replaced by mimetic and 
normative ones (Djelic 1998).  
Moving from institutions to institutionalization and thinking about the latter 
as a set of sequential stages – habitualization, objectification and sedimentation 
– suggests that the level of embeddedness and robustness of institutional rules 
will vary. Certain patterns of social behaviour – those that are semi-institution-
alized or still at stage one or two – will be more likely to become subject to 
critical evaluation, modification and elimination than others – those that are 
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fully institutionalized. Or as Jepperson (1991) puts it, degrees of institutionali-
zation are best conceived in terms of relative vulnerability to social intervention. 
Within a given society, varying patterns of behaviours will coexist that situate 
themselves at different stages of institutionalization. Instead of considering the 
systemic nature of institutional arrangements, we should take in this internal 
diversity and differentiation and the contradictions that it may generate (Sewell 
1992; Clemens and Cook 1999). We should also look at border points or points 
of interface through which, we have suggested, alternatives may appear. In this 
volume, we focus in particular on those points of interface that put in contact the 
national and the transnational. Together, those are the cracks in the system – or 
at its boundaries – that are likely to make it more vulnerable. Those cracks or 
weaker points indicate the more obvious potential loci for change. We argue that 
external pressures can act as triggers. Major shifts in the environment, such as 
long-lasting alterations in markets or radical changes in technology may play a 
role. Internationalization, we add, is also in itself source of pressure (see also 
Westney 1987; Campbell 1993; Djelic 1998; Boyer et al. 1998; Lane 2001). Our 
claim in this volume is that we should combine a focus on internal loci of dis-
ruptions and opportunities with an argument on external triggers of change. We 
point to institutional change as emerging where and when internal challenges 
and spaces of opportunity combine with and are being reinforced by external 
triggers and alternatives. Globalization is in part about the multiplication of 
configurations of that type. 
Agents of Change: Foreign versus Domestic, Dominant versus 
Fringe Players  
The understanding of institutions presented here as not only constraining but 
also enabling points to the role and significance of actors, sometimes character-
ized by the labels ‘strategizing actors’ or ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. Institu-
tional change comes about when certain groups or networks of actors develop 
new patterns of interaction, from scratch or through bricolage, when certain 
groups or networks seize upon patterns existing elsewhere and promote them as 
superior to existing arrangements, working to mobilize as large and significant a 
support as possible for that project.  
The challenge to institutionalized rule systems can best be understood, we 
argue, when we have a clear picture of the impact different actors can have. 
From the perspective we develop here that the national/transnational interface 
is important to understand changes in national rules of the game, we differen-
tiate between dominant and fringe actors but also between foreign and domestic 
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actors. The following categorization, summarized in Table 2, is schematic and 
should be taken as identifying ideal types rather than as real life description.  
Table 2: Actors of Change – Foreign or Domestic, Dominant or Fringe 
 Domestic Foreign 
Dominant Resistant/Driving Force Missionaries 
Fringe Activists/Agitators Absent 
 
Dominant actors are those who hold a central position in terms of power and 
social status, based on privileged access to resources. Dominant foreign players 
will have the strength and resources to push along their own rules of the game 
well beyond their traditional boundaries of activity. They can become ‘mission-
aries’ of institutional change. Dominant local players will tend to do one of two 
things – either to resist change or else be its driving force.  
In periods of relative stability, they will tend to resist institutional change. 
Dominant local players are likely then to have vested interests in existing insti-
tutions. Their perception of the world also has a tendency to remain structured 
by just these institutions. In periods of crisis, radical rupture or acute challenge, 
dominant local actors can turn however into active promoters of institutional 
change and in fact become its main driving force. The case of Nokia in Finland 
perfectly illustrates that (Tainio et al. in this volume). Other examples can be 
found in the Eastern part of the European continent. 
One should add here the particular case of the transnational firm where a 
dominant actor is neither fully domestic nor entirely foreign but somewhere in 
between. There will be a tendency for these types of actors to be unsatisfied with 
the preexisting institutional conditions characteristic of their country of origin. 
These actors will then possibly turn into active promoters of institutional change 
– the case of Nokia once again illustrates that but one thinks also of Vivendi in 
France or Daimler Benz in Germany. Another possible reaction will be for those 
hybrid, a-national actors to flee their country of origin and set up their head-
quarters elsewhere – Swedish multinationals have tended to follow that path.  
On the other side, one finds fringe players. Fringe players are located at the 
periphery of a particular institutionalized area. They tend to have little power, 
low social status and limited access to resources. Fringe players from foreign 
contexts will tend on the whole to be absent from the local scene. For the most 
part, local fringe players will also be relatively powerless and passive. The few 
that may take the initiative, however, may be quite innovative. In relatively 
stable periods, local fringe players can have more incentives than dominant 
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players to experiment with new solutions since such experiments are less costly 
to them in terms of reputation. They are also less likely to be sanctioned by 
central players for violating rule systems, and if successful they will gain 
increased power and social status from institutional change. Fringe players have 
been identified as critical actors for developing alternative practices at the micro 
level which were in contradiction with existing institutions at the macro level. 
Leblebici et al. (1991) show how fringe players changed the governance structure 
of an inter-organizational field such as the US broadcasting industry (see also 
Jones 2002). Stearns and Allan (1996) refer to fringe players as successful chal-
lengers of existing practices in inter-firm coordination in the US whose 
innovation then became legitimized and institutionalized, through adoption and 
adaptation by dominant players, as a market for mergers and acquisitions.  
Fringe players can challenge existing arrangements either at the level of dis-
course or at the level of practice – a combination of both being in fact quite 
likely. This challenge could remain localized and lead nowhere. In certain cir-
cumstances, it could also come to arouse wide support and it could possibly 
become appropriated, adopted and adapted, by dominant players. The new solu-
tion will thus be advocated as superior until it becomes taken for granted. Insti-
tutional innovation through fringe actors is therefore more likely to take the 
bottom-up road and to operate through mimetic and normative pressures since 
these actors usually do not have the means to institutionalize their solutions 
through coercion and sanction from above.  
In the context of globalization, we see another path as being particularly oper-
ational. This is the direct or indirect alliance between foreign dominant actors 
pushing their own rules of the game and a few local fringe players that find an 
interest in sponsoring those alternative rules (all contributions in Part I, see also 
Djelic 1998; Djelic and Ainamo 1999). This kind of alliance appears to take the 
champions and partisans of status quo and stability through a pincer movement.  
Institution Building in the Transnational Space 
A central claim of this volume, we have seen, is that the transnational level is 
one important purveyor in today’s world of alternative rule systems that may 
contribute to the transformation of subsocietal or societal institutional arrange-
ments. Those alternatives may themselves be rules that are dominant in foreign 
subsocietal or societal institutional spheres. They may also be, and this is we 
believe another major claim of this volume, rule systems in the making with a 
transnational scope or dimension. This process of structuration of a space tradi-
tionally conceived as anomic translates into institution building and institutional 
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emergence at the transnational level. It is a marker and defining characteristic, 
we propose, of the recent episode of globalization.  
Institutional Emergence – the Transnational Dimension 
Even though there may have been cases, historically, when actors created social 
institutions from scratch and in a ‘vacuum’, the genesis of institutions in con-
temporary societies unfolds in general in a form that is closer to ‘bricolage’ 
than to ex nihilo generation (Offe 1995; Hall and Taylor 1996; March and Olsen 
1998). Actors build upon, work around, combine, reinvent and reinterpret logics 
and institutional arrangements that either function elsewhere or with which 
they are familiar. This goes, we propose here, for institution building in the 
transnational space.  
Within the context of nation-states, the creation of new institutions is likely 
to be influenced by the existing institutional environment. Interests and identities 
of social actors that engage in institution building, coalitions and conflicts 
between groups with similar and competing interests as well as the cognitive 
templates that actors use are shaped by the preexisting sets of institutional 
arrangements in which those groups of actors inscribe themselves. The state, in 
the form of political actors or agencies, does play a particularly significant role 
in that process of institution building at the societal level (Clemens and Cook 
1999) but this should not blind us to the impact and significance of other actors.  
A lot of these features translate, we argue, at the transnational level. Institu-
tion building in the transnational sphere brings in a multiplicity of actors or 
groups of actors. The interests and identities of those actors, their characteristic 
patterns for entering conflicts and coalitions as well as the cognitive templates 
that define them, reflect to a great extent the preexisting institutional arrange-
ments in which they set themselves. Very often, those have a societal or national 
character (Morgan 2001a, b). Hence a number of national actors extend their 
national contextual rationalities into the international sphere and through their 
repeated interactions they become involved in institution building in a newly 
emerging transnational sphere (see for examples McNichol and Bensedrine or 
Ventresca et al. in this volume). Or they may become involved in reforming, 
renegotiating and changing existing international institutional arrangements as 
motivations, power relations and conditions change over time (see Lilja and 
Moen or Lehmkuhl in this volume).  
Through time, repeated interactions and the building up of a transnational 
frame, actors are emerging that have transnational – in the sense of not purely 
national – identity and sense of selves. Hence the interplay between well known 
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national structures and logics and more emergent transnational patterns and 
rationalities is a key direction for institutional analysis. This is a path on which 
we engage in this volume. 
The Missing Links – Institutionalization as a Process in the 
Transnational Space 
We have proposed above to talk about institutionalization as a process rather 
than about institutions. And building upon the work of Tolbert and Zucker 
(1996) we have differentiated between three moments – that fit in fact on a con-
tinuum and are not discrete or separate stages. This differentiation between 
moments of habitualization, objectification and sedimentation is particularly 
valuable, we believe, for looking at institution building in the transnational 
space. And a focus on institutionalization as a process rather than on institutional 
systems also makes particular sense when looking at the transnational space. 
Such a perspective makes it possible to overcome the limits and shortcomings 
that are characteristic of existing debates. A first and quite significant advantage 
is that this perspective makes it possible to navigate between the Charybdis of 
under-determination and the Scylla of over-determination. The literature on and 
around the transnational arena has tended to cluster at two extremes.  
On the one hand, the mainstream of the International Relations (IR) tradition 
pictures the transnational space as essentially anomic – a shapeless and struc-
tureless arena. Agents are essentially free and rational, maximizing their own 
interests with little burden being put on them by the space in which their action 
takes place. Krasner (1999, p. 72), for example, in his recent book on sover-
eignty still questions the impact of institutions in the international sphere and 
argues that in this sphere a logic of consequence usually will prevail over a logic 
of appropriateness (see also Gilpin 2000). Other writers, such as Ruggie (1993, 
1998), have given more weight to international organizations and drawn a more 
complex picture of the interdependencies between domestic and international 
power structures. Heterodox writers within the IR tradition go even further by 
directing attention to the structuration of social networks across borders. Neo-
Gramscian scholars, in particular, focus on processes of transnational class for-
mation and the emergence of ‘historical blocks’ of public and private authorities 
(Cox 1983, 1987). Transnational social networks are regarded as central mecha-
nisms through which ideologies and worldviews – and hence structures and 
institutions – enter in conflict and contradiction and hegemonies come and go 
(van der Pijl 1984, 1998). 
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On the other hand, cultural neoinstitutionalism – the one strand of institu-
tional theory taking the transnational space seriously – has underscored the 
thickness and highly determining nature of the transnational institutional system. 
The transnational space is made up of a dense web of cultural rules and patterns, 
symbolic constraints that shape and determine organizations and structures but 
also social action and actors themselves. ‘What actors do’, in the words of key 
proponents of this theoretical perspective, ‘is inherent in the social definition 
of the actor himself. The particular types of actors perceived by self and others 
and the specific forms their activity takes reflect institutionalized rules of great 
generality and scope’ (Meyer et al. 1994, p.18). 
This volume will point to a path somewhere in between – where the web of 
institutional constraints is multilayered and in the making, malleable and 
changing. Actors are neither free, independent or discrete, nor fully and only 
rational in the classical sense. The idea of social networks is useful but what 
emerges once again is the multiplicity and multidirectionality of those networks 
as well as their undeniable embeddedness in multiple and more or less overlap-
ping institutional frames.  
Our perspective in this volume and our take in particular on institutionaliza-
tion allows us to avoid another simplistic and extreme alternative. This alterna-
tive has to do with the type of ‘rationality’ that can be found within the transna-
tional space. The clear opposition here is between the idea of a universal or 
global rationality – neutral and theoretical that would point in fact to something 
like the ‘end of history’ or to the ‘best of all possible worlds’ – and the convic-
tion on the other hand that rationalities are plural and that when they express 
themselves in the transnational space they tend to reflect in fact national embed-
ding institutional systems. National systems do emerge as important in shaping 
actors and organizations’ rationalities, however we do not rule out the possibility 
for the emergence of transnational bases of rationalities, in the process of trans-
national institution building.  
A number of heterodox writers situated between the two extremes of tradi-
tional International Relations and cultural neoinstitutionalism have identified 
elements of such processes of transnational institution building which can be 
integrated in our research agenda. What these authors find is an increasing blur-
ring of border lines between political and private authority in the transnational 
sphere and increasingly overlapping ‘spheres of authority’ (Rosenau 1997) and 
‘webs of influence’ (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). These emerging transna-
tional arenas of institution building are populated by increasingly multiple and 
heterogeneous groups of agents, ranging from multinational companies and 
other private corporate actors (Stopford and Strange 1991; Strange 1996; Cutler 
et al. 1999) over representatives of social movements (Held et al. 1999; Boli and 
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Thomas 1999; O’Brien et al. 2000) to the national political actors which prevail 
in traditional IR theory (for a critical review of the role of the latter actors in the 
project of building a European Union see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). 
Finally, the perspective we propose makes it possible to avoid falling in the 
evolutionary trap. Institution building is not a simple and linear process. And 
this may be particularly true in the transnational space. The continuum of the 
three moments – habitualization, objectification and sedimentation – is analyti-
cally useful but only if it is not used and understood at face value. The fact that 
we can differentiate between those three moments does not (indeed, far from it) 
say that those three moments necessarily follow each other in a linear and sys-
tematic manner in real life. Nor does it say that there is an evolutionary and 
unavoidable path going from pre-institutionalization or habitualization to the full 
stabilization of institutional rules of the game. On the contrary, those three cate-
gories can allow us to think of circular paths, ruptures and discontinuities. 
Institution building in the transnational space proceeds at varied pace according 
to the ‘layer’ that we look at. Such institution building remains highly fragile, 
particularly during the first two moments, which makes ruptures, discontinuities 
or even backlashes highly possible. The kaleidoscope or multilayered nature of 
the institution building process in the transnational space also makes it possible 
and even likely that there will be shortcuts. Rather than starting from scratch and 
the progressive aggregation of and negotiation between behaviours, institution 
building in a particular layer can get inspiration from rules of the game and 
institutional patterns already stabilized in a neighbouring layer.  
Trickle-up and Trickle-down Trajectories – Bridging Levels of 
Analysis 
We have argued above that processes of de-institutionalization and re-institu-
tionalization are particularly likely to emerge at the interface of national and 
transnational rule systems. We have made suggestions of how we could use 
this interface as a starting point for our exploration into globalization as a pro-
cess of institutional building and institutional change, particularly looking at the 
confrontation between different national actors and between foreign and domes-
tic, dominant and fringe players. But under which conditions do changes in 
actors’ rule systems at the micro or subsocietal level become relevant for other 
areas and for higher order rules at the societal or even transnational level? And 
in which circumstances do changes in macro level rules – at the transnational or 
national level - diffuse to the micro level and become relevant for the behaviour 
of individual economic actors?  
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Some of the debates and disagreements around the likelihood and degree of 
institutional emergence and change in relation to globalization can be explained 
by the fact that scholars place themselves at different levels of analysis without 
attempting to create a link. Whereas many studies of institutional change and 
institutional evolution are situated either at the organizational field level or at the 
transnational level, work that highlights stability and durability of institutions is 
predominantly focused on the nation-state level (Knill and Lenschow 2000). In 
order to reconcile change with stability, we need a better understanding of how 
those different levels of institutionalization are linked together. We need to 
investigate the processes through which institutional change in particular sub-
societal systems contributes to the transformation of higher level institutional 
orders – both at the national and transnational level - and vice versa.  
With regard to institutional change within national societal spaces, two types 
of processes are important here. First, transnational institution building can 
effect upon national institutional systems directly, in a top-down way, leading 
dominant actors to redefine national regulations or other forms of institutional-
ized patterns of economic organization. The passing of a new European legisla-
tion relating to transport, for example, forced national governments, business 
corporations and trade associations within the different European member states 
to redefine their national rule systems and patterns of cooperation (see Plehwe 
with Vescovi in this volume). Secondly, transnational institution building can 
have also an indirect impact on national institutional systems if actors at the sub-
societal level start to introduce new and challenging rules of the game. Cumu-
lative changes of that type eventually lead to ambiguities and uncertainties that 
initiate bottom-up processes of change resulting in redefinitions of higher level 
rules and principles. Examples are initially ‘minor’ changes in the rules govern-
ing the French asset management industry (Kleiner in this volume) or in foreign 
investment in Finnish corporations (Tainio et al. in this volume) which in fact 
and together with other minor changes became a source of pressure on the wider 
national systems of corporate governance and elite production and reproduction. 
These two forms of institutional change are what we will refer to as trickle-
down and trickle-up trajectories in the conclusion to this volume. Building on 
the empirical contributions that make up this volume, we will propose in this last 
chapter a more analytic and systematic description of those mechanisms linking 
changes in the international business environment to different forms of institu-
tional change in national societal spaces. The focus here will be clearly on 
transnational institution building as trigger for national institutional change. 
In turn, when analysing institution building in the transnational sphere, the 
national origins and components of this process should not be lost from sight. 
From this perspective, transnational institution building can be analysed as pro-
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cesses of reinterpretation, recombination and bricolage of institutional fragments 
from different contextual origins. We suggest that there are basically three dif-
ferent modes in which the rubbing, contestation and combination of different 
institutional fragments can take place at the transnational level. 
In the dominant mode, the building of institutions at the transnational level 
simply reflects one dominant local or national model. This is illustrated by the 
diffusion of American economic rules such as the logic of ‘shareholder value’ 
through international financial market actors to other countries (see Tainio et al., 
Kleiner and McKenna et al. in this volume). 
A second mode of transnational institution building is negotiation. In this 
case, institution building in the transnational sphere comes about as the result 
of confrontation, debate and bargaining between actors coming from different 
national rule systems. Examples are the negotiation of unified legal frameworks 
for specific sectors of economic activity within the European Union (see Plehwe 
with Vescovi and Midttun et al. in this volume) or the bargaining between the 
USA and the European Union leading to a multilateral agreement on labelling of 
genetically modified soy (see McNichol and Bensedrine in this volume). 
A third form of transnational institution building is the emergent mode. It 
tends to involve actors with less clear, and often more transnational identities. 
It tends to take place at the borders of multiple rule systems and to be of a high 
complexity which makes outcomes rather unpredictable. These three modes 
will be, based on the empirical chapters of this volume, described in a more 
systematic manner in the conclusion. 
Overall, we suggest that in order to understand the complexities involved in 
the link between globalization and institutions we should investigate more 
closely the interplay between transnational institution building and changes in 
national institutional systems. The interactions between these two types of pro-
cesses over time can create a reinforcing cycle of institutional change and trans-
national institution building. With such an understanding of globalization, a lot 
of work still remains to be done. The contributions in this book represent 
attempts to study globalization from the conceptual viewpoint outlined above. 
They attempt to capture parts of the overall interplay between globalization as 
institutional change at the national level and globalization as institution building 
in the transnational sphere. They do this by focusing on specific sectors, coun-
tries, points and periods in time. Whereas contributions in Part I analyse how 
globalization has become a trigger for institutional change within the national 
space, contributions in Part II analyse processes of insitutionalization in the 
transnational sphere. Taken together, the contributions to this volume provide 
rich evidence for the repeated, and often mutually reinforcing, interactions 
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between institutional change at the national and institution building at the trans-
national level. 
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